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Abstract: The lessons learned from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident have focused on prevention measures 
designed to protect nuclear reactors and conventional crisis management methods. Although there is still no 
end in sight to the accident that occurred on 11 March 2011, the way in which engineering operations to 
secure the facilities have been carried out offers new insight into the capacity of organizations to adapt in 
situations that go beyond deterministic frameworks. In this article, we examine this extreme engineering 
scenario, which we call “engineering thinking in emergency situations”. 
Keywords: nuclear accident, engineering thinking, defence-in-depth, emergency, engineering 
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While the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl led to the development of new concepts in 
nuclear safety, studies of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi have paradoxically remained confined to 
improved defence-in-depth and guidelines for the management of a severe accident. However, it is 
important that this lack of analysis does not encourage the idea that the accident in Japan can be 
reduced to a series of failures or widespread destruction. Instead we argue that the event should be 
understood as a chain reaction which, for over three years, has created repeated crises in the 
context of a societal emergency. From this perspective it can be argued that in general, concurrent 
engineering projects that aim to contain risks and enable fuel extraction can also be viewed as 
initiatives taken by operators and industrialists to maintain control of their installations and ensure 
that safety levels meet global requirements and can respond to environmental challenges. In this 
paper, we develop the concept of “engineering thinking in emergency situations” to designate the 
specific mode of intervention in such a context.  
The sequence of events that led up to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and current activities on-site 
illustrate an emergency resulting from a situation that overwhelmed the classical engineering 
scenarios which form the basis for plant design and operation. Post-accident, the dramatic events at 
Fukushima Daiichi called into question the ability of actors at the plant to transition into “resilience”, 
in a context that went far beyond deterministic safety frameworks (1).  In this paper we look at 
potential ways forward, and propose in this context the concept of “engineering thinking in 
emergency situations”. This concept, if properly formalized, may be an effective strategy that can be 
used to respond to an extreme situation (2). More generally, it sheds new light on the fundaments of 
nuclear safety management: consequently, as a complement to prescriptive safety methods, the 
capacity to transition into a dynamic of resilience may increase the robustness of an operator that is 
faced with an “unthinkable” situation (3).  
1 THE EMERGENCY, ENGINEERING FAILURE 
The initial analyses of the causes of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi highlighted shortcomings in 
safety standards used by the operator and oversight authorities (1.1). Similarly, the ongoing crisis 
that dates back to 11 March 2011 demonstrates that the multitude of engineering operations that 
have been implemented to contain the many threats are insufficient, not least because safety 
measures themselves proved to be inadequate in an emergency (1.2). Consequently, any lessons that 
are learnt from the accident must lead to improvements in the ability of operators to transition into 
a resilient dynamic (1.3).  
1.1 INADEQUATE DESIGN AND OPERATING STANDARDS  
We now know1 that the earthquake caused the automatic shutdown of the reactors and the loss of 
all external power supplies. Emergency generators took over and supplied the emergency cooling 
systems of reactors 1, 2 and 3. The tsunami that followed flooded generators, rendering monitoring 
equipment and valve control mechanisms inoperable. Operating conditions in the control rooms and 
communication between these rooms and the on-site crisis centre became particularly difficult. 
Reactor 1’s isolation condenser (IC) emergency cooling system was automatically shut down, while 
the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems of reactors 2 and 3 continued to operate normally; 
later the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system of reactor 3 took over when the RCIC failed.  
                                                          
1
 Official Report of the Independent Commission of the Japanese Parliamentary Inquiry into the Accident at 
Fukushima, available from: http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf 
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The sequence of failures in reactors 1, 2 and 3 were relative independent as their control in an 
emergency was the responsibility of the shift supervisor at each unit2. However, there were 
shortcomings in overall monitoring by the on-site crisis centre, mainly due to the transmission of 
incorrect or incomplete information by shift supervisors.  
The failure to detect the automatic shutdown of the IC in reactor 1 (due to operators’ lack of system 
knowledge), the failure of the RCIC in reactor 2 after three days of operation, and the intentional 
shutdown of the HPCI in reactor 3 (in anticipation of a possible failure) led to intermittent core 
cooling, without the operator having properly assessed the status of the reactors. Furthermore, the 
damage to facilities and lack of preparedness for such a situation delayed the implementation of 
alternative cooling solutions involving the injection of seawater. At the same time, the difficulty of 
providing a power supply to pressure relief valves and venting systems severely disrupted the ability 
to control container pressure, which delayed the injection of water. The three reactors were 
therefore left uncooled for several hours. Explosions, probably due to hydrogen generated by 
oxidation and cracking of fuel cladding during core meltdown damaged the structure of reactors 1 
and 3. This was followed by a deflagration at the building of reactor 4, whose pipework was 
connected to reactor 3, which weakened the fuel storage pool in this unit. Leaks were detected in 
the walls of reactor 2. Altogether, this damage led to significant release of radioactive material.  
The independent commission of inquiry established by the Japanese Parliament pointed out the 
shortcomings in the action taken by the Tokyo government, Japanese nuclear authorities and the 
operator (the Tokyo Electric Power Company; TEPCO) in their immediate management of the crisis, 
daily monitoring of safety-related events, updates to the risk analysis and design standards, and in 
the oversight of the operator3.  
However, it should be noted that the precise causes of the accident must be further investigated in 
the course of the decommissioning of the plant. The reasons for the shutdown of the RCIC at reactor 
3, which led to the explosion that caused structural damage and the extent of the damage generated 
by the corium formed during core meltdown, remain unknown.  
1.2 THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EMERGENCY SAFETY MEASURES 
As time has passed, the operator TEPCO has set up alternative cooling and nitrogen inerting systems 
in the reactor containment vessels and tanks. As the site remains exposed to seismic and flood risks, 
some of this equipment has been placed in raised areas and tsunami protection systems have been 
built. The operator has installed control systems to monitor key parameters and remote monitoring 
systems have been implemented for the detection of leaks in order to stabilize the infrastructure.  
Since the accident, around 400 m3 of cooling water has been injected into the cores of reactors 1, 2 
and 3 on a daily basis. To avoid tank overflow, the operator initially implemented a closed-loop 
cooling system to treat caesium contamination, with the support of foreign companies. Since then, a 
water decontamination system for all radionuclides has been developed, but it has proved very 
unreliable and is regularly subject to outages. In addition, the seal between the cooling circuit and 
groundwater is not impermeable. Every day, about 800 m3 of water is pumped from the reactors to 
                                                          
2
 Nevertheless, there were cases of events occurring at one reactor that could affect another: for example, the 
explosion at reactor 3 disrupted the installation of the mechanism for the injection of seawater at reactor 2. In 
this respect, the proximity of the reactors to each other could be seen as a shortcoming. 
3
 Official Report of the Independent Commission of the Japanese Parliamentary Inquiry into the Accident at 
Fukushima, op. cit. 
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be treated4, but the high level of contamination of the recovered water prevents its release into the 
ocean. Some of this water is therefore stored in temporary reservoirs that are not always completely 
reliable, in difficult operating conditions. In order to maintain reactor cooling on a long-term basis, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advised TEPCO to study the conditions under which it 
would be possible to carry out a controlled discharge of some of the stored water into the ocean 
(IAEA, 2013). In December 2011 the operator issued a “recovery of control” plan, which was 
approved by the Japanese government and has since been updated (TEPCO, 2013). It outlines plans 
to remove fuel from the spent fuel pool in reactor 4 prior to plant decommissioning. To this end, 
TEPCO has undertaken extensive preparatory civil engineering work, in particular aimed at 
strengthening the structure of the spent fuel pool and constructing areas for fuel handling: this work 
has been going on for more than two years. The removal of fuel has now begun and is expected to 
continue for another year in conditions that are potentially unsafe given the uncertainties about 
state of the fuel. At the same time, a research and development program has been established to 
provide scientific support to waste treatment activities (IAEA, 2013).  
Further work is being carried out in the following areas: prevention of the infiltration of water from 
or into groundwater; the provision of access to reactor containers 1, 2 and 3; clearing debris; and the 
preparation of storage locations for radioactive waste. An impermeable wall is being constructed to 
restrict the flow of contaminated water into the ocean.  
It is clear that TEPCO is carrying out an intense programme of activities in order to contain 
radioactive pollution and regain control of the facility. The operator must establish a mode of 
operation that both meets the legitimate concerns of civil society regarding safety requirements, and 
enables plant decommissioning (which is expected to take until 2050). The extent to which these 
operations gain support from the Japanese public and the international community is partly 
dependent on the reliability of the safety equipment and transparency of measures of radioactivity – 
a sensitive issue given the damage to the site. This work is regularly interrupted by emergencies, 
notably due to vapour emissions or leaks, for example in reactor building 3 (TEPCO, 2014). Other 
critical issues that have had an impact on the work are high levels of contamination in areas around 
the plant and the failure of water decontamination systems.  
1.3 INITIAL LESSONS, NEW PERSPECTIVES AND THE CAPACITY TO TRANSITION INTO RESILIENCE  
Given the scale of the Japanese accident, the authorities of member countries of the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) carried out additional safety studies, in order to take into account “beyond-design” 
(level 4) scenarios or those involving multiple failures. These complementary studies and scenarios 
concluded that there was no imminent risk to active nuclear facilities, and reaffirmed the validity of 
the defence-in-depth concept (NEA, 2013). Nevertheless, much work remains to be done for the 
concept to be effectively implemented.  
The outcome of the ongoing feedback from the Fukushima Daiichi experience has therefore been to 
strengthen specific safety systems in order to bolster safety margins in the case of exceptional 
events. Work continues at both the normative and technical level to improve the integration of rare 
and extreme threat scenarios, improve crisis communication and the performance of frontline actors 
in degraded situations, and to specify criteria for the location of nuclear plants. Other ongoing work 
includes improvements to the robustness of electrical equipment and the safety of hydrogen 
ventilation systems, and to improve methods for the analysis of risks caused by natural phenomena. 
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 Source: Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Available (in Japanese) from 
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/140115/140115_01c link.pdf 
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The idea that several installations on the same site can be simultaneously damaged has been 
integrated into the guidelines for severe accident management, given that it requires additional 
resources over a long period of time. Some operators have organized rapid response teams that are 
ready to intervene on-site during such a crisis, in order to provide technical and human support.  
In the academic world, the accident has raised the question of the resilience of complex socio-
technical systems that are affected on a long-term basis by catastrophic events. Generally speaking, 
the “resilience” of a system can be defined as its intrinsic ability to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during or following changes or disturbances, so that it can sustained required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel et al., 2005). From this perspective, the capacity to 
adapt is not limited to functional and procedural responses to threats that can be anticipated in the 
design stage and whose scope is based on safety assumptions (Fujita et al., 2013). In particular, it 
should be noted that while the dispatch of technical support teams or material resources to a site 
where there has been an accident can reinforce the emergency planning procedure it does not, in 
itself, guarantee the capacity of the organization to adapt to an unexpected, ongoing situation. 
Moreover, some authors have noted that even the guidelines for severe accident management that 
have been developed following the Fukushima Daiichi accident are based on limited assumptions 
(Vayssier, 2012).  
As long ago as 1977, Carlsen and Fink (1978) raised a very similar, pertinent question following power 
outages that occurred in the United States. The authors defined various states for the power supply 
network and highlighted that the normal operating mode could not, structurally, meet the 
requirements needed to manage the system in an emergency. In conditions characterized by a lack 
of resources and time pressure, the operator would have had to be able to take action on a heroic 
scale, coordinated at many different points in the network in order to avoid the collapse of the 
system and then recover nominal operations as soon as possible.  
Fukushima Daiichi reminds us of the progress that remains to be made. Specifically, the situation 
TEPCO currently faces illustrates how difficult it is for an organization to curtail the unfolding of 
events in conditions that are critical on both a physical and organizational level. This was the 
motivation for our interest in the capacity of an organization to transition into resilience, in other 
words the ability of a socio-technical system to quickly recover to a state that ensures (at a 
minimum) that the situation does not get any worse, in emergency conditions and under significant  
social pressure. In such a situation, the system must be able to mobilize all available resources – 
although they may initially seem limited – following an event which causes damage of such 
magnitude that activities are severely disrupted or even completely destroyed.  
It should be noted that resilience is the capacity to act, in the time before, during and after the 
emergence of a threat. The study of the organizational factors that help a system to transition into 
resilience has little to learn from a static and formal division into “accident – state of emergency – 
post-accident phase”5. Instead we must develop a perspective that reflects the timing of events. 
Moreover, although the “official” emergency phase has ended at Fukushima Daiichi, the risk of 
pollution or even a nuclear accident cannot be dismissed. Securing the plant’s fuel stores is proving 
difficult and the threat of another earthquake (whether followed by a tsunami or not) remains real.  
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 Governmental working groups address the concept of resilience; formally it is considered in the post-accident 
context. Nevertheless, they focus on the conditions for the return to normal life of populations affected by 
radioactive pollution. A notable example from the United States is the work of the National Council on 
Radiological Protection and Measurements, Approach to Optimizing Decision-Making for Late-Phase Recovery 
from Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incidents. 
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At Fukushima Daiichi there are encouraging signs that the system is becoming resilient: two years 
after the accident, the IAEA noted the progress made by the operator TEPCO, which has adopted an 
increasingly proactive approach to plant decommissioning based on innovative technological 
solutions (IAEA, 2013). Furthermore, the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety 
(Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté, IRSN) highlights that TEPCO has benefitted from earlier 
experience of operating incidents to improve engineering work in the design stage (IRSN, 2013). Such 
actions have contributed to the operator becoming more resilient, even if unexpected problems 
continue to arise. In this context, it is reasonable to examine the factors that may have helped the 
operator to transition into resilience more quickly, from the first moments following the accident, in 
order to prevent the ongoing succession of adverse events that have occurred since 11 March 2011. 
In the case of a highly technical activity such as the operation of nuclear facility, it is thus essential to 
examine the execution of engineering work in unusual conditions and in an extremely hostile 
environment.  
2 ENGINEERING, A RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY  
Safety standards prescribe the expected performance of an engineering project. As we have noted, 
catastrophe can ensue if they are overwhelmed – whether because of unexpected events or the 
failure to apply operating procedures. However, the engineering strategies used to meet technical 
requirements can also enhance the organization’s capacity to adapt and transition into resilience. As, 
to the best of our knowledge there is no formal definition of such an activity, we here refer to it as 
“engineering thinking in emergency situations”. We begin with a definition of the concept of 
engineering (2.1), then we introduce the concept of the emergency (2. 2), and finally, that of 
“engineering thinking in emergency situations” (2.3).  
2.1 A DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF ENGINEERING  
In general, engineering is defined as the comprehensive study of all the aspects of an industrial 
project (technical, economic, financial and social) and the coordination of in-depth studies by 
specialists. By extension, it is used to refer to the study of, or activities concerned with the 
modification or development of technical applications that correspond to a field of knowledge in the 
Sciences. Engineering is an activity that structures the design and manufacturing processes of 
products that meet a specific need. Engineering activity is formalised into a cascade of processes and 
phases, from design to on-site execution via purchasing activities6, which underpin project planning 
and its traceability.  
Koen (1985) proposed a definition of the “engineering method” as a strategy that would offer the 
best possible change using the available resources in a poorly understood situation, or one subject to 
uncertainty. In this sense, the engineer is unlike the academic researcher, who searches for the true 
or false predicates that underlie a body of knowledge. The engineer approaches science from a 
technical perspective in which the most important issue is effectiveness: performance is judged by 
the way the product is commissioned. As Koen highlights, the first step taken by the engineer is to 
formalize a need for change expressed by a social entity. This conceptual step carries an element of 
uncertainty about the final outcome and how to achieve it. The stated purpose of the change is also 
likely to evolve as the project unfolds. In order to deal with such vagaries, engineering methods such 
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 For a detailed description in the domain of nuclear power see Cacuci, 2010. 
 7 
as those formalized in the “AGILE manifesto” began to appear; first in the domain of computing and 
then in manufacturing7.  
The advantage of Koen’s definition is that it highlights the importance of resource constraints: the 
engineer can only provide an approximate answer to a given question, as the answer depends on 
available resources. Engineering therefore includes an element of uncertainty that heuristics, based 
on the results of previous experience, aims to control. A skilled engineer uses various heuristic 
methods to solve a given problem, and the success of the result is assessed on socio-cultural criteria. 
This idea is one of the foundations of the Design Thinking School (Brown, 2008). 
The particular role played by time should be highlighted. Time management underlies many 
definitions of engineering in the context of planning, which translated into the development of 
productivism (Boneville et al., 2006). In addition, the time allocated for a project cannot be 
considered as an available resource.  
We now examine the specific case of engineering activities in the emergency situation at Fukushima 
Daiichi concerning the treatment of contaminated water. Our analysis is based on publicly-available 
information (presentations and public reports, the media, etc.). 
Beginning in March 2011, the reactor tanks at Fukushima Daiichi reached their maximum storage 
capacity and TEPCO sought to establish a system for recycling injected cooling water. The operator 
asked various industry specialists including the French company Areva, the American company 
Kurion and the Japanese companies Hitachi and Toshiba to assess the project. Given the volume of 
water to be treated, there was no standard, established solution. Areva offered a modified version of 
its standard decontamination system for use with the Actiflo®/ Multiflo™ units developed by the 
company Veolia, while Kurion designed a specialised system for the pre-treatment of caesium. Two 
points emerge from these interventions in the context of our introductory remarks on the definition 
of engineering. 
On the one hand, the problem formulation, the decision to treat the radionuclide caesium as a 
priority, the scale of the equipment needed and risk assessments was based on a heuristic approach. 
Key figures were selected from historical data and technical solutions were gradually formalized 
through a process of trial and error: as a result, several alternative methods were discarded following 
the test period. The basis for the solution eventually deployed is a proven method used by Areva to 
treat radioactivity at their Marcoule site in France, which was modified in order to work with 
equipment originally intended for the purification of wastewater (Veolia’s Actiflo® system). In turn, 
this equipment, which is used to process large amounts of water, had to be modified for use in 
radioactive environments with a specific set of chemicals. Similarly, the protection of on-site teams 
from radiation was managed on the basis of estimates of exposure levels to radiological pollutants. 
However, as the these levels evolved significantly as the work was carried out, the initial estimates 
had to be revised, and consequently engineering studies comprised a significant element of 
uncertainty.  
On the other hand, there were significant constraints in terms of time, environment and material and 
human resources. Therefore Areva adopted an approach that took advantage of the resources 
already available in Japan (such as Veolia’s Actiflo® systems). The system was implemented in under 
three months, during which time engineers had to conduct safety studies and simulations that took 
account of both the marine environment and radioactivity levels. As far as possible, studies were 
conducted in parallel in order to save time; nevertheless, many problems emerged. Project managers 
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were faced with incompatibilities between the technical schedule and legal provisions for worker 
protection. Furthermore, on-site implementation was a particularly difficult challenge for 
engineering and technical teams. In particular, the construction of Areva’s Actiflo-Rad® unit 
mobilized up to two hundred people on-site who were all required to wear a mask at all times; teams 
struggled to meet tight deadlines and handle resource constraints. For example, various equipment 
modifications had to be carried out directly on-site and work schedules had to take into account the 
hostile environment, which required mandatory medical supervision. According to Areva, the hostile 
environment and the difficulty of communication and decision making in multicultural engineering 
teams had a negative impact on the quality of the work. 
The system was finally commissioned in time to prevent the overflow of tanks and was able to treat 
caesium. However, its subsequent operation was intermittent, and in July 2011 there was a leak of 
contaminated water resulting from a poorly-designed PVC joint that connected a hose to a water 
pipe. From the engineering perspective, the question of the extent to which the nature of the 
emergency had an impact on the selected strategy remains open. The same argument applies with 
respect to the problem of sludge storage and the coordination of the various solutions put forward. 
On this latter point, we note that both the Areva and Kurion systems proved to have shortcomings 
which interrupted the treatment of contaminated water, whereas, in fact, the two systems could 
have been operated independently. This example illustrates the extent to which “classical” 
engineering can be negatively affected by factors that are inherent in an emergency. Tight deadlines 
and high levels of uncertainty can have a significant impact on selected strategies. Therefore before 
we describe the concept of “engineering thinking in emergency situations”, it is first necessary to 
define the role the “emergency” plays in determining the objectives of engineering strategy.  
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF THE EMERGENCY  
Roux-Dufort (2007) and Albala-Bertrand (2000) were the first to argue that emergencies reflect a 
twofold reality:  
 on the one hand, a scenario with adverse consequences is very likely in the short term;  
 on the other, only swift action and the mobilization of massive resources may be able to 
prevent damage.  
This understanding of the emergency is based on the idea of an extraordinary deadline that brings 
the actor face-to-face with the limits of their resources and expertise. The concept of the emergency 
therefore requires careful thought, beyond that of the organizational frameworks that structure daily 
activity. Such frameworks are largely based on repeated actions linked to procedures, and the 
fragmentation of knowledge that translates – at the organizational level – into a division of labour 
and skills. 
Here, an “organization” is understood as a structure that is the result of a decision and which 
minimally consists of a hierarchy, rules, a group (the “members”) and instruments for supervision 
and sanction that are applicable to an area of activity with a specific purpose (Ahrne et al., 2010). In 
the domain of engineering, it also includes specific tools (methodological, material, informational, 
etc.). The formal framework that surrounds the activity of a socio-technical system tends to create an 
equivalence between available resources and the corresponding organizational structure. The 
identification of available resources and decision-making strategies that are applied in an emergency 
are therefore directly related to a specific organization. Consequently, a lack of time and resources 
can create a conflict with the standardized execution of the organization’s activity, to the point that it 
significantly degrades its level of performance.  
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Furthermore, the degree of the “emergency” is partly determined by the social context and, in the 
case of nuclear safety, by an overriding obligation to respond to the threat of radioactive 
contamination. Industrial organizations must therefore take account (to a greater or lesser extent) of 
the social acceptability of a failure to act. It should be noted that, within a particular organization, 
these decisions are essentially personal: consequently, the choices and preferences of decision 
makers may not only be challenged (Ahrne et al., 2010) but also, in an emergency, they must be seen 
as legitimate in the eyes of groups external to the organization.  
The context is therefore one of crisis. At the managerial level, “crises” are closely linked to the 
difficulty of decision making in response to an adverse event. The crisis can be fed by situations 
where decision makers find it difficult to formulate their goals or different actors disagree about 
objectives. 
From our point of view, the emergency can act as a catalyst for the recomposition of networks of 
actors and organizations. In the case of Fukushima Daiichi it includes populations that are exposed to 
risk, safety authorities and engineering teams that are responsible for the management of reactor 
cooling and the containment of pollutant discharges. These groups of actors are created and take 
action around shared values (avoid the unacceptable), and interact with each other on the basis of 
representations framed by perceptions of hazard and time pressure. In this dynamic environment, 
engineers are faced with various obstacles, notably: 
 the lack of collective memory (for example, when faced with an unprecedented event)  
 the lack of standard modeling (in the case of an extreme phenomenon)  
 shortcomings in norms and standards that usually underpin working practices (in the case of 
a physical environment that represents an exceptional threat).  
For managers of an engineering project, subjective perceptions of the emergency can be divided into 
three equally important objectives: management of deadlines (when faced with an imminent threat), 
the effectiveness of the outcome (when the aim is to reduce risk) and the reliability of the end result 
(which should not create new risks).  
2.3 A DEFINITION OF “ENGINEERING THINKING IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS”  
As we have seen, engineering methods consist of strategies to achieve an optimal result, given 
available resources and uncertainties about the technical feasibility of the solution. When 
engineering is impacted by an emergency, it may run into several problems:  
 a pronounced state of uncertainty;  
 a critical lack of resources, which may become all the more significant as the environment 
becomes increasingly hostile (for example in the context of a disaster). The hostility of the 
environment can translate directly into the resources that are available to complete the project 
(restricted access to information, work rates adjusted to radiation levels, complicated logistics, 
etc.). In this respect, overly-rigid legal provisions (for example concerning radioprotection) may 
limit the availability of resources in critical situations;  
 high societal expectations, in terms of meeting deadlines, efficiency and the reliability of the 
eventual solution. The “approximate” solution adopted by the engineer will be judged in terms 
of the actions that needed to be taken in response to the emergency.  
Decision-making strategies that maximize results based on one or another of these constraints may 
prove incompatible, and decision makers can find it difficult to adapt to contextual changes that 
require the initial strategy to be revised (Bettman et al., 1996). As time pressure increases, cognitive 
strategies tend to minimize the use of resources, although the need for effectiveness and reliability 
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favour an in-depth analysis of all potential solutions. Consequently, in conditions where immediate 
deadlines must be met and high levels of reliability and effectiveness are required, strategic decision 
making becomes difficult. In the same vein, although experiments can be carried out to remove 
uncertainties or develop new heuristic approaches, this reduces the time available to deal with the 
emergency. Moreover, in the face of risk, the decision maker may prove averse to innovation 
(Bonneville et al., 2006), although uncertainty should encourage the exploration of new avenues. 
When engineering methods that are designed for “traditional” project management with fewer 
constraints and uncertainties are applied to an emergency, mutatis mutandis, it is likely that the 
strategy will derail. A particular issue concerns the validity and relevance of “classical” risk 
assessments in an emergency. When innovative methods are applied in the heat of an emergency 
under severe time constraints, it is likely that critical shortcomings (from the point of view of society) 
are not taken into account. A specific example is the failure of the joint installed on Areva’s Actiflo-
Rad® equipment (see 2.1 above).  
The concept of “engineering thinking in emergency situations” describes engineering activities that 
are difficult to conduct due to emergency conditions. The indicators of an emergency basically 
concern tension between high socio-cultural expectations of performance and a lack of readily-
available resources in an uncertain situation. It should be noted that management instruments, 
together with technical knowledge and expertise are considered as resources.  
  
We therefore define engineering thinking in emergency situation as: 
Engineering activities that are significantly impeded due to a lack of resources in the face of a 
societal emergency.  
In practice, engineering thinking in emergency situations is an extreme case of engineering, which, in 
order to be implemented, requires organizational changes that are specific to the management of 
this type of project.  
Resources, which include current knowledge and know-how, do not in themselves constitute a 
limited set from which the result is optimized. On the contrary, their boundaries can be adjusted and 
become a control parameter of the optimization function – should the organizational framework be 
disrupted. In addition, the final outcome must offer guaranteed performance and have the support 
of civil society. It is imperative that its design meets the deadlines imposed by the emergency, as a 
solution that is implemented following the manifestation of a threat is likely to be ineffective. In 
large part, these criteria for the evaluation of the performance of the end result are imposed on the 
engineer, and constraints tend to be applied to the targeted objective.  
The issue is therefore one of innovation, based on the development of specific organizational 
methods that guarantee effective engineering in situations where it is used as a crisis management 
strategy. 
3 ENGINEERING THINKING IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, A NEW NUCLEAR 
SAFETY CONCEPT  
The effectiveness of engineering thinking in emergency situations is measured by the capacity of an 
organization to adapt its working methods and the management of engineering procedures to 
provide technical solutions that meet the expectations of society in a crisis (3.1). To be fully effective, 
such a concept must draw upon broader conceptual frameworks for safety management. The aim is 
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to enable the socio-technical system to transition into resilience as quickly as possible (3.2) and to 
establish new foundations for the conventions that underline risk management (3.3).  
3.1 A CAPACITY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION  
As we have seen, in the context of an emergency an organization must sometimes restructure its 
engineering activities in order to meet the expectations of society and to overcome any related 
difficulties (for example, a lack of appropriate tools or the division of labour). In such a situation, it is 
important that engineering activities are not thought of in a conceptual framework of “project 
execution”, but rather in terms of a new organization. In the project execution framework, planning 
and control processes draw upon concepts such as “tools” and “users” and focus on a definite 
timescale. By contrast, the concept of the “organization” draws upon ideas such as “expectations – 
actions – learning” loops that are inherent in interactions between individuals (Packendorff, 1995). 
The potential for creation and adaptation can only be realised if a new organization and associated 
management modes are adopted that are specific to engineering activities in an emergency 
situation. For example, the companies that were brought in to develop the water processing system 
at Fukushima Daiichi partially modified their working conditions and changed their usual 
organizational framework by mobilizing the necessary resources. These initiatives are an example of 
a need that justifies the implementation of an organization specific to the emergency for the conduct 
of engineering activities. However, the approach they took was one of project execution under 
severe time pressure, rather than a framework of temporary organizational change. This decision 
clearly limited their ability to foresee the shortcomings mentioned above and no doubt led them to 
confine their understanding of the expectations of society to the ability to meet deadlines. In 
summary, the concept of “engineering thinking in emergency situations” should be taken into 
account by operational actors who must formalize organizational changes for the execution of 
engineering activities when such change is required by the context of an emergency.  
The first step in the effective implementation of engineering thinking adapted to emergency 
situations is a definition of the purpose of the activity: not only must it create a technical solution for 
hazard prevention; its outcome must also win the support of civil society. A technical solution is seen 
as an effective response to an imminent hazard only insofar as its performance with respect to risk 
characteristics is socially acceptable. Upstream, engineering thinking begins with the formalization of 
the problem, which involves a degree of approximation. If the project is to eventually succeed, it is 
crucial that at this stage the expectations of civil society are taken into account. Consequently, 
engineering activities are broadened to include other communities of actors through an assessment 
of the true goals of the activity (Engeström, 2011), which must also have value in the societal 
environment. For example, the decision to prioritize the treatment of caesium in the contaminated 
water at Fukushima Daiichi was eventually deemed inadequate and major engineering works 
followed to design a treatment system for almost all radionuclides. The delay in commissioning this 
system, which failed on numerous occasions during testing, was a critical factor for judging 
performance. In this project, one of the goals of the engineering teams was enshrined in a set of 
“target rates” for water decontamination. The expanded version of this goal would have led to the 
definition of these rates taking into account the expectations of the affected populations, which 
would have opened up the possibility that the waste could be discharged into the sea.  
In this reformulated framework, a general lack of resources (materials, methods, information, etc.), 
the poor division of labour and the large number of communities involved justified an organizational 
move away from the context of project execution in emergency conditions. In the context of this new 
paradigm, timeframes and deadlines play a much more important role as structural factors than 
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those that can be set via the usual project planning tools. Consequently, from the moment when 
engineering activities become a strategic component of an organization in an emergency situation, 
they have to integrate this “one-off” initiative through a “temporary” organization (as defined by 
Lundin et al., 1995). In practice, such engineering activity only exists in the time window defined by 
the emergency and disappears with it. 
It is particularly important that the temporary organization enables the emergence of new resources 
that can meet the expectations of the public. It should be noted that the need for greater resources 
can result from a disaster context: the fact that the situation is beyond the scope of standard 
engineering practice means that the socio-technical system may be in an unforeseen state following 
the emergency (e.g. if its activities have been significantly disrupted or interrupted due to the 
destruction of essential functions). Consequently, the organization must put its efforts into 
innovation under time pressure and explore new options. Innovation, as described here, is a process 
that can take many forms including the creation of new methods or engineering instruments, 
modifications to existing resources or an assessment of related resources. In this respect, the 
importance to society of engineering projects undertaken in an emergency is so significant that 
creative solutions can emerge. This is in contrast to “classical” engineering activities, which take 
place in situations (including emergencies) where the existing organization is able to design solutions 
that fully meet the expectations of society given the current state of knowledge and the resources 
immediately available8. It is important to highlight here that appropriate changes to the organization 
and broadening the goals of activities so that they meet societal expectations can also help to 
mitigate the risk of criticism, which is a natural consequence when personal decisions are taken in a 
hierarchical structure (see 2.2 above).  
The capacity of an industrial organization to adapt in order to successfully carry out engineering 
thinking in emergency situations can therefore be evaluated by at least three criteria: its capacity to 
expand the goals of its activities and incorporate the expectations of civil society; its capacity to 
temporarily change its structure to achieve these reformulated goals; and finally its capacity, through 
this new organization, to promote innovation that supplies resources. These three criteria help the 
organization to transition into resilience more quickly when faced with an extreme situation.  
3.2 ACCELERATING THE TRANSITION INTO RESILIENCE 
No amount of lessons learned from previous experience will lead to the development of infallible 
standards (Quarantelli, 1986), and it is a mistake to try to provide an exhaustive description of 
dysfunctional scenarios or overestimate the performance of agents in a critical situation9. Operators 
are irremediably exposed to risks that cannot be accounted for in deterministic safety management 
frameworks. Attempts to mitigate the consequences of such events must focus on improving the 
overall robustness of the socio-technical system from the moment the disaster first manifests.  
Paradoxically, deterministic approaches to safety dramatize uncertainty: when the aim is to create 
order, the introduction of disorder is destabilizing. The capacity of an industrial organization to 
transition into resilience after an accident depends on its capacity to quickly switch from a normal 
and stable operating state to a more adaptive and innovative mode that ensures vital functions. 
Systems whose survival is threatened are faced with a paradox: they must find effective solutions in 
                                                          
8
 This clearly distinguishes work on emergency engineering from other research into project engineering 
methods where the aim is to compensate for critical failures that are beyond the scope of maintenance 
projects cf. Wearne, 2002. 
9
 In the context of working groups on human and organizational factors, cf. NEA, 2013. 
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conditions where resources may have been partially destroyed by the accident. Strategies for 
transitioning into resilience consist of reconfiguring the organization and decision-making strategies 
in order to optimize the availability of all resources, including those that only emerge from an 
innovative dynamic.  
A counter-example of the resilience approach is seen in the problems encountered at Fukushima 
Daiichi concerning the restoration of electrical power to safety relief depressurization valves (SRV). 
Workers found it very difficult to improvise sources of power such as mobile generators or car 
batteries. This example from the Japanese site shows that a delay or failure in the execution of 
engineering work can itself be an aggravating factor in the crisis, as it generates new risks and erodes 
public confidence. Although only one element of operations that are undertaken in a catastrophic 
situation, engineering activities can make a significant contribution – in this case, through restoring 
functions necessary to operate the reactors or designing ways to handle contaminated discharge. 
However, whether it concerns heroic action in uncertain conditions or an intervention supported by 
an instrumented strategy, the success of engineering in response to an emergency depends on the 
readiness of the organization. This leads us to conclude that is necessary to develop specific working 
methods that aim to enable the organization to transition into resilience, which go beyond ideas put 
forward by some industrialists of planning engineering resources for a crisis situation.  
3.3 RETHINKING THE RULES AND THE STANDARDS  
The lessons that have been drawn from the Fukushima Daiichi accident have led to improved safety 
standards. In particular, more stringent performance requirements for critical equipment and its 
operation have been put in place and the validity of the defence-in-depth concept has been 
reaffirmed (NEA, 21013). The approach has been shown to be effective and it is appropriate that 
oversight authorities prioritise the effective implementation of associated precepts. The corpus of 
standards describes both the scope of risks and the methods to be implemented to manage them. 
However, this approach does not promote the ability to become resilient. To this end, we argue that 
organizational issues should form part of the defence-in-depth concept, thereby providing the ability 
to handle “unthinkable” scenarios. To this end, engineering thinking in emergency situations 
represents a mode of operations that enables a socio-technical system (that is initially helpless) to 
regain technical control in a context that is so traumatic that it has completely destroyed all the 
resources necessary to take action.  
These epistemological considerations require radical changes to an organization, especially in the 
nuclear context. The main changes apply to the plant’s safety culture and the understanding of risk 
management roles. When conditions are so degraded that engineering thinking specific to an 
emergency situation is required, it is not enough to mobilise technical resources through the 
application of established procedures; instead specific operating procedures must be developed, i.e. 
a reconfiguration of engineering activities and associated management tools appropriate to the 
emergency. The implementation of engineering thinking in such situations may involve changes in 
decision-making procedures, a new distribution of roles in engineering departments and the 
formalization of project management indicators tailored to the conditions of design and 
implementation, and the intervention. It follows that it is the responsibility of the actors in the 
reorganized structure to take actions in response to the disaster in order to achieve a favourable 
outcome, by implementing, where appropriate, ad hoc means.  
We can therefore foresee a situation where nuclear safety oversight authorities require operators to 
demonstrate their ability to implement an effective engineering strategy in emergency situations 
and, more generally, to demonstrate their capacity (skills, expertise, methods, etc.) to quickly 
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transition into resilience. The goal set for the operator (including its surrounding community) would 
no longer be to simply contain a critical failure: its safety performance would be assessed on the 
basis of the capacity of its engineering systems to adapt. This capacity for adaptation must enable 
the recovery of key critical functions following a major disturbance (planned or not) on such a scale 
that it cannot be contained or controlled by the implementation of state-of-the-art equipment.  
This on-site requirement for operators should be accompanied by a point-by-point relaxation of 
procedures for the issue of permits and monitoring functions. In serious situations, the operator 
should be able to waive legal provisions that protect individuals when this appears necessary to 
uphold the public interest. This should only happen in exceptional situations and be subject to 
appropriate control, if necessary ex post factum. 
We end with a societal argument for the implementation of this new concept. The resources 
mobilized by the Japanese government and TEPCO in order to secure the Fukushima Daiichi site 
should be seen in terms of their appropriateness. Although various experts have argued that 
contamination levels at Fukushima warranted (without undue risk) the discharge of waste into the 
sea (Lake, 2013), the need to ensure a “zero” pollution risk has become a societal issue. The failures 
in the contaminated water treatment systems that were noted shortly after they were commissioned 
clearly had an influence on the general population, which deemed the risks to the environment 
created by the discharge of treated water into the sea unacceptable. Consequently, considerable 
human, material and financial resources have been deployed to prevent the risk of radioactive 
release generated by the treatment of contaminated water, to the likely detriment of the 
management of other risks. This demonstrates how a deterministic framework can create a lack of 
understanding in the general population, should safety measures implemented by decision makers 
fail. In an emergency situation, the capacity to adapt and respond effectively to new technical 
problems can become essential in order to ensure the trust and backing of the general public and the 
international community. The reward for more successful engineering thinking in response to risk 
during a crisis may be a better way to “integrate” the risk into society, with the aim of optimizing 
resources allocated to prevention.  
4 CONCLUSION  
In the nuclear domain, engineering standards define the realm of the acceptable. Failures are 
recorded and associated with prevention measures, which are themselves broken down into 
engineering performance requirements that are framed in terms of design or operations. Despite 
these attempts to create certainty, emergencies reveal the limitations and errors in prior decisions.  
The situation at the Fukushima Daiichi site has highlighted another potential function of engineering. 
In addition to traditional safety approaches, which are framed by standards or regulations that are 
developed in the initial design stages, engineering thinking in emergency situations aims to contain 
the risks in a socio-technical system at a time when its core functions have been partially destroyed 
or are threatened. The challenge is to integrate a social dimension into engineering activities, and go 
beyond the numerical expression of a basically technical analysis. Temporary changes to the 
organization must provide a managerial framework that enables innovation to emerge in an 
emergency context. The challenge has a strategic dimension, as a successful engineering in an 
emergency is likely to help a system that is overwhelmed by a disaster to transition into resilience 
more quickly.  
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These initial thoughts on the concept of engineering thinking in emergency situations suggest a 
fundamental rethink of ideas of resilience and how to achieve it. Designing resilience requires 
appropriate conceptual references that take into account changes to a system in an emergency. 
While traditional safety models10 are able to describe the sequence of events that may lead to 
damage, and the appropriate prevention measures that must be put in place, they cannot represent 
the state of the system or, in particular, its evolution during a prolonged disaster. This issue means 
that it remains difficult to measure the impact of current events at Fukushima Daiichi. It is clear that 
we need to renew our conceptual tools in order to fully understand the events that have unfolded 
since 11 March, 2011 and learn to think about “the never-ending accident”.  
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FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI, ENGINEERING THINKING IN AN ONGOING 
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Abstract
The lessons learned from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident have focused on prevention measures designed 
to protect nuclear reactors and conventional crisis management methods. Although there is still no end 
in sight to the accident that occurred on 11 March 2011, the way in which engineering operations to se-
cure the facilities have been carried out offers new insight into the capacity of organizations to adapt in 
situations that go beyond deterministic frameworks. In this article, we examine this extreme engineering 
scenario, which we call “engineering thinking in emergency situations”.
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